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Family Violence and Family Property:
A Proposal for Reform
Robin L. Preble*
Introduction
Property law is one way of controlling the family' by deter-
mining who constitutes family and the rights to which family mem-
bers are entitled. It reflects prevailing economic realities as well as
predominant behavioral ideals.2 Intestacy statutes, in particular,
embody government policy decisions regarding who is to have a
right in an intestate's estate and thus what family behaviors and
relationships are socially desired and acceptable.3 The traditional
family is encouraged and supported by family property rights which
ensure that family members will be provided for.4 It is in this con-
text of family property as family policy that the problem of family
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1. Family, for the purposes of this article, is defined as those persons who are
related by blood or marriage and as such would be eligible to take under the intes-
tate succession statutes of the Uniform Probate Code [hereinafter UPC]. See UPC
§§ 2-102 through 2-105 (1990).
2. "The rules of inheritance are a means of exploring the human condition and
connectedness with others. They force us to confront our moral obligation to future
generations. They create and reflect family and community configurations.... They
are also one of the primary means by which the community defines deviancy and
thereby controls the private and public activities of its members." LAWRENCE W.
WAGGONER ET AL., FAmILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS,
AND FuTuE INTERESTS 33 (1991).
3. See generally ALISON REPPY & LESLIE J. ToMPmNs, HIsTOmicAL AND STATu-
TORY BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF Wiuks: DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION, PROBATE AND
ADmnGSTRATION 67-90 (1928); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY
LAW 4-35 (1989). See also WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 2, at 69-71 (discussing the
historical roots of intestacy rules and practices such as primogeniture-the prefer-
ence of male descendants over female descendants-which have since been aban-
doned as the concepts of family and property have evolved).
4. In other words, when the decedent leaves behind any estate of value after
death, the whole of family property law via intestacy schemes, elective share, omit-
ted spouse, pretermitted heir and other provisions guarantees that the spouse or
other surviving family members will have access to the decedent's property. A pri-
mary exception to these family property rights is the statutory forfeiture of such
benefits where the benefitting family member killed the decedent. See infra part
III.C.1. (discussing so called "slayer" statutes).
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violence5 and intestate succession rights in particular must be
examined.
This article asserts that the failure to recognize the relevance
of family violence to family property policy is a grave shortcoming
that is ultimately harmful to both individual families and society at
large. Additionally, the failure to address family violence in the
non-criminal context of family property law undermines efforts to
condemn and deter family violence. To remedy this defect of law
and policy, this article advocates that Minnesota family property
law, and the Uniform Probate Code upon which much of state law is
based, be reformed to require that evidence of family violence be
considered by the probate court as part of property distribution pro-
ceedings. Statutory schemes such as intestacy laws are problem-
atic because they represent legislative policy decisions, yet
presently they fail to acknowledge or deter family violence. Thus, a
model statutory standard is proposed whereby if a "past pattern of
abuse"6 by a family member upon the decedent is shown, the abus-
ing family member would be denied significant inheritance rights in
the decedent's estate.
Part I highlights the problem of family violence and discusses
the current system of intestate succession in Minnesota and under
5. The term "family violence" is preferred over "domestic abuse" because it is
more descriptive of the problem and is inclusive of all of the forms of violence be-
tween family members that this proposal seeks to address. For the purposes of this
article, family violence includes only violence between persons who are related by
blood or marriage. Violence between former spouses, or unmarried couples, is not
included. See the proposed family violence statute infra at appendix A (providing an
exhaustive definition of family violence). See also generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTicE,
ArroRNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAmY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT (1984) [here-
inafter TASK FORCE ON FAMILy VIOLENCE] (discussing the problem of family violence
nationwide and the many types of violence to be addressed and combatted).
Although violence and abuse obviously can and does occur between people in a
variety of relationships, including unmarried heterosexual and homosexual couples,
such violence, while equally harmful, has little relevance to the present discussion.
Intimate relationships that fall outside of the traditional family remain beyond the
scope of inheritance laws. See infra part I.C. (discussing the current intestacy
scheme in Minnesota and under the UPC). Thus, fortunately or unfortunately, there
is no danger of these abusers taking property by intestacy since these relationships
are not formally recognized and thus no property rights attach.
6. See Proposed Family Violence Statute, subd. (c), infra at appendix A. The
'past pattern" standard is modeled after Minnesota's Domestic Homicide Statute.
See MINN. STAT. § 609.185(6) (1994) [hereinafter DOMEsTIC HoMmCmE STATUTE]. The
statute imposes first-degree murder liability for anyone who "causes the death of a
human being... while committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has en-
gaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim and the death occurs
under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life." Id. The
statute is currently under review by the Minnesota Supreme Court. See State v.
Grube, No. C1-94-518. See also infra part II.B. 1. (discussing consitutionality of stat-
utory "pattern" language).
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the Uniform Probate Code. Part II lays out the proposed reform
and discusses its elements and operation. Part III examines the
asserted rationales for the current scheme and suggests that the
decedent's intent and public policy would be furthered by adopting
a standard for addressing family violence in intestate distribution
proceedings. This section also examines relevant precedent sup-
porting the adoption of the proposed family violence statute. Part
IV anticipates and addresses concerns regarding the practical im-
plementation of the proposed statute. Finally, Part V concludes
that even beyond the direct impact of the reform in individual
cases, the symbolic importance of articulating a clear policy con-
demning family violence on all fronts, including family property
law, is ample justification for the reform.
I. Family Violence and the Current System of Inheritance
Under the current system of family property law, the wide-
spread problem of family violence is not being adequately ad-
dressed. Although there is much statistical evidence about the
nature and degree of the problem, outside the realm of criminal law
policy makers have yet to respond adequately to the complex issue
of family violence. This failure leaves individual victims of family
violence with few viable means of protecting their property. Fur-
ther, the absence of a coherent family violence policy within family
property law leaves states to support family violence unwittingly
through the recognition of inheritance rights in the decedent's
estate.
A The Statistics
According to experts, "[w]ith the exception of the police and
the military, the family is perhaps the most violent social group,
and the home the most violent social setting, in our society."7
Although the problem of family violence, once brushed off as mere
"domestic disputes,"8 has gained increasing attention from the law
and the community in recent decades, there are still many indica-
tions that family violence is not yet being fully and adequately ad-
dressed by our legal system.9 Although wife beating, for example,
7. Richard J. Gelles & Murray A. Straus, in Violence in the American Family,
CRnvm AND THE FAmLy 88 (Alan J. Lincoln & Murray A. Straus eds., 1985).
8. See Mary E. Asmus et al, Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: De-
veloping Effective Prosecution Strategies From Understanding the Dynamics of Abu-
sive Relationships, 15 HAmmE L. REv. 115, 121 (1991) (citing James Ptacek, The
Clinical Literature on Men Who Batter: A Review and Critique: Family Abuse and Its
Consequences, in NEw Dm RCTONS IN RESEARCH 149, 149-62 (G. Hotaling ed., 1988)).
9. See generally RosEmAviE TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAW 124-52 (1984).
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was criminalized in all states by 1920,10 the reticence of police,
prosecutors, courts, and legislators to intervene in family violence
situations remains problematic today." Statistics show that any-
where from 382,000 to 566,000 women 12 are beaten every year in
Minnesota alone.13 Nationwide, the statistics are staggering.
Three to four million women are physically abused by husbands or
partners each year in the United States.14 Two to four thousand of
10. See Asmus et al., supra note 8, at 116 (citing R. EMERSON DOBASH & RUSSELL
DOBASH, VIOLENCE AGAINST WIVES: A CASE AGAINST PATRIARCHY 59-64 (1979)).
11. For example, statistics show that the criminal justice system continues to
treat assaults involving domestic relationships differently than those involving
strangers. One study "found that, out of the forty-three cases involving misde-
meanor assault, thirty-four cases (79%) were dismissed, eight cases (9%) resulted in
convictions, and one case remained pending. These statistics illustrate the contin-
ued de facto decriminalization of domestic abuse by the courts." Asmus et al., supra
note 8, at 117 (citing Mary O'Doherty & Andrew Wolfson, Violence Against Women:
One County's Record Shows Abuse Cases Are Routinely Dropped, COURIER-J. Feb. 17,
1991, at 1). This compares with national conviction statistics for all felony assaults
of 84% (including both guilty pleas and convictions at trial) with only 11% resulting
in dismissals. BARBARA BOLAND ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION OF
FELONY ARRESTS, 1988 20-23 (1991) (Table 1) [hereinafter THE PROSECUTION OF FEL-
ONY ARRESTS]. (Note: These statistics do not appear in the report itself but are de-
rived by combining the assault statistics of the five major jurisdictions listed.)
Further, even the typical outcome of 100 felony arrests for all crimes nationally is
54% with only 21% dismissed in court. Id. at front cover.
12. The use of statistics showing the abuse suffered by women is intended only
as an example of the type and frequency of family violence in the United States.
While women are not the only victims of family violence, they are more frequently
victimized than men and thus statistics reflecting violence towards women are more
illustrative of the problem of family violence. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1992) 149
[hereinafter CRIMNAL VICrMIZATION] (reporting that the victimization rate of vio-
lent crimes against women committed by relatives was 3.8 per 1,000, while the rate
for men was 0.8 per 1,000). Family violence is by no means, however, exclusively a
women's issue. Children who witness such abuse are indirectly harmed whether or
not they themselves are directly abused and many grow-up to become abusers them-
selves. See TASK FORCE ON FAMmY VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 2-3 (discussing the
cyclical nature of family violence).
13. See Asmus et al., supra note 8, at 120.
14. Id. (citing a letter from Eleanor Smeal, entitled "Stop Violence Against Wo-
men" (published by The Fund for the Feminist Majority) (Summer 1991)). Other
available statistics show similar levels of domestic violence nationally. One scholar
states that, "[olne-third to one-half of all women who live with male companions
experience degradation in the form of brutality or threatened brutality." Tong,
supra note 9, at 124 (citing Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for Wo-
men: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 624 (1980)).
But see Armin A. Brott, Battered-Truth Syndrome: Hyped Stats on Wife Abuse Only
Worsen the Problem, WASH. POST., July 31, 1994, at C1 (asserting that the current
widely cited figures that millions of women are abused each year are inaccurate and
are creating a "false epidemic."). Brott also takes issue with other widely reported
statistics. Relying on the National Family Violence Survey (NFVS) sponsored by the
National Institute of Mental Health and conducted by Murray Straus and Richard
Gelles, the article attacks the widely held beliefs that women are far more likely to
be the victims of family violence than men and that domestic violence is the most
common cause of injury to women. Id. According to the article, "the NFVS-and a
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those women will be killed.15 In Minnesota, the statistics show an
increase in such murders over the past several years. According to
one scholar:
Recent homicide statistics for Minnesota confirm that sixteen
women were murdered in 1988. In 1989, at least eighteen wo-
men were murdered by their partners. Eleven of those women
had left the abusive relationship or were trying to leave when
they were killed. In 1990, at least twenty-seven women were
murdered, twenty-two of them by a partner.16
Additionally, by some estimates family violence is the leading cause
of injury to women. 17 One study concluded that forty percent of
women seeking treatment in emergency rooms and nineteen per-
cent of female trauma patients were the victims of family vio-
lence.1s These disturbing numbers indicate the widespread and
continuing trend of such abuse, despite the proliferation of criminal
legislation.
Women are not the only victims, however, and spousal battery
is not the only type of family violence about which to be concerned.
Other statistics show that thousands of children are victimized by
family violence every year. In 1992, over 46,000 children nationally
were known to have suffered abuse by a parent.19 Further, many
such statistics, which reflect only incidents reported to researchers
or the police, skew the picture and underrepresent the extent of the
problem.20 Experts acknowledge that most family violence is unre-
variety of other studies-have found that men are just as likely to be the victims of
domestic violence as women." Id. Additionally, the article asserts that the injury
figures are based on an inaccurate interpretation of a small study that was not appli-
cable to the general population of American women. Id.
15. See Asmus et al., supra note 8, at 120.
16. Id. (citing Women Murdered in Minnesota in 1990, WOMEN MURDERED IN
MINNESOTA IN 1990, MINNESOTA COALITION FOR BATTERED WOMEN UPDATE, (Minne-
sota Coalition For Battered Women, St. Paul, Minn.), Jan. 28, 1991, at 1). See gener-
ally TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, supra note 5.
17. See REPORT ON THE SURGEON GENERAL'S WORKSHOP ON VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC
HIALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICzS AND DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC
HEALTH SERVICE (1986). But see Brott, supra note 14.
18. See Demie Kurz & Evan Stark, Not-So-Benign Neglect: The Medical Re-
sponse to Battering, in F'EmST PEBsPECIEs ON WIFE ABUSE 249, 249-51 (Kersti
Ylld & Michele Bograd eds., 1988).
19. See CRIMINAL VICTnmZATION, supra note 12, at 150 (Table III).
20. See id. at 1, 149. The statistics in the report are compiled from a survey of
the general public and as such rely on a victim's willingness to report the crime. Id.
at 1. Additionally, statistics compiled by survey also rely on an initial understand-
ing by the surveyed individual that he or she was in fact a victim or perpetrator of a
crime. According to another national government survey, "[a] large proportion of
family violence is committed by people who do not see their acts as crimes against
victims who do not know they are victims." TASK FORCE ON FAMIY VIOLENCE, supra
note 5, at 5.
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ported and undocumented.21 Thus, the real incidence of family vio-
lence is probably much higher.22 According to the U.S. Attorney
General, "[aiscertainable reported cases of child abuse and neglect
have doubled from 1976 to 1981. In addition to the one million re-
ported cases of child maltreatment, there may be yet another mil-
lion unreported cases."23
In light of these statistics, it is clear that family violence in all
its forms demands more attention from the legislatures and the
courts. While many states, including Minnesota,24 have instituted
policies that criminalize "domestic abuse" the continued high-level
of violence is evidence that the message is not yet loud enough and
is not being heard. The law may have come a long way in de-em-
phasizing the historical view of marriage and family as private
sanctuaries beyond the scrutiny of the law, but it has not yet gone
far enough.25
B. The Reality: Family Violence and Family Property
Rights
Consider the following scenarios:
Scenario #1: John and Jane26 are in their mid-thirties and
have been married for ten years. They have two children. The mar-
21. GAIL A. GOOLKASIAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, CONFRONTING DoMEs-
TIC VIOLENCE: A GUIDE FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 55 (1986).
22. Id.
23. TASK FORCE ON FAMILy VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 11 (citing ThE AMEmCAN
HUMANE ASS'N, CHILD PROTECTION Div., Highlights of Official Child Neglect. and
Abuse Reporting, 1982 (1984)).
24. See, e.g., Min. Stat. § 518B.01 (1993) [hereinafter DOMESTIC ABUSE ACT].
According to one authority, "[a] survey published in 1985 revealed that every state
had passed some form of legislation in response to concern about domestic violence
.... " WALTER WADLNGTON, DoMESTic RELATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 259 (3d ed.
1995). The rationale for such statutes is expressed in the Arkansas Domestic Abuse
Act which states that "this chapter shall meet a compelling societal need and is nec-
essary to correct the acute and pervasive problem of violence and abuse within
households in this state." Aim STAT. ANN. § 9-15-101 (1994).
25. The current intestacy scheme as it stands establishes a default scheme of
property rights based on legal status alone, regardless of the beneficiary's behavior
or the nature of relationship between the decedent and the intestacy beneficiary.
This approach likely stems from the long held belief that behavior within the con-
fines of the family was not a matter of public concern. See Franklin E. Zimring,
Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 521, 522-28 (1987) (discuss-
ing the zone of privacy that has traditionally been accorded the family and which has
defined the limits of legal inquiry).
26. Most of the facts used in this hypothetical scenario were taken from an ac-
tual Minnesota case. See State v. Hebert, No.C3-91-1882, 1992 WL 145327 (Minn.
Ct. App. June 30, 1992). Unlike the hypothetical scenario, however, the Hebert case
culminated in murder, where the angry and abusive husband ultimately killed his
wife and buried her body in a shallow grave. The defendant was convicted of second-
degree felony murder and sentenced to 150 months in prison. Id. at *1. Kate
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riage has always been rocky and over the years John has repeatedly
beaten Jane causing her to be hospitalized for her injuries on sev-
eral occasions. The abuse over the years has included incidents
where John picked up a baseball bat and threatened to hit Jane
with it, threatened Jane's life, punched her in the head and, on one
occasion, drove her out into a remote area threatening her with a
knife. Jane has also told friends about black eyes and fleeing the
couple's home to get away from John. Jane has called the police
and 911 for help on several occasions. After years of such abuse,
Jane finally sought a legal separation from John and an order for
protection. Additionally, Jane moved out of the marital home into a
battered women's shelter and eventually into her own apartment.
Angered by her defiance, John continued to threaten Jane and vio-
lated the restraining order on at least one occasion, prompting Jane
to call the police and have John arrested. She had been separated
from John for six months when she was killed in a car accident on
her way home from work. Jane left no will.
Scenario #2: Eric2 7 is a young man in his mid-twenties. He
has never been married and has no children, but has lived with his
girlfriend Becky for five years. Although Eric is now a well ad-
justed and successful adult, as a child he was physically abused and
neglected by his parents. His teachers noticed unusual bruises on
his arms and legs on several occasions. Additionally, they observed
that Eric often wore the same clothes to school for weeks at a time.
His teachers reported their concerns to the social services bureau.
The agency's investigation concluded that Eric had been physically
abused and neglected by his parents. There were also some signs of
sexual abuse. Consequently, Eric was removed from his parents'
home and placed in foster care. Although he lived with the same
family for many years, he was never formally adopted. 28 When he
Hebert, the defendant's wife and victim, endured all of the abuse that occurred in
this scenario and more. She had moved out of the home, into a women's shelter and
into her own apartment. Id. She had been granted an order for protection against
the defendant and had been separated from him for about six months at the time of
the murder. Id. On the night of the murder, Kate had made arrangements with
the defendant to look after their daughter while Kate attended a counseling session.
When Kate arrived at the house, an argument erupted. The defendant then shoved
Kate causing her head to slam against a bed post. The fall resulted in a depressed
fracture of the occipital bone of Kate's skull causing her death. Id. at *2.
27. Although this scenario is not based on a specific case, disturbing cases of
abuse and neglect abound. See, e.g., In re M.N., 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 1021 (chil-
dren beaten with cribbage board and books and denied food); In re C.K., 426 N.W. 2d
842 (Minn. 1988) (children beaten and threatened with knives and chains).
28. Under the UPC, had Eric been adopted, his biological parents would no
longer have been able to inherit from him. See UPC § 2-114 (b) (1994) ("[aln adopted
individual is the child of his [or her] adopting parent or parents and not of his [or
her] natural parents"). The comment to this section notes that, "for inheritance pur-
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turned eighteen, Eric moved out on his own and worked his way
through college. When he collapsed and died suddenly of a heart
attack, Eric had neither seen nor spoken with his parents in over
ten years. He left no will.
Scenario #3: Ted is a middle-aged man in his forties. 29 He is
not married and although he has a steady job, he is still largely
dependent on family money and support. His grandparents were
very successful in several business ventures and the family has con-
tinued to prosper. Ted is aware that when his grandmother dies
(his grandfather having already passed-away) he will inherit a
large sum of money under her will. Frustrated and distraught over
his lack of financial independence, Ted conceived a plan to kill his
ailing grandmother by smothering her with a pillow while she slept.
One night after drinking heavily, Ted decided to act on his plan. He
went to his grandmother's room and smothered her. Ted was sub-
sequently arrested and prosecuted for the murder of his
grandmother.
C. The Law's Response
The above scenarios are disturbing, and in all cases involve
criminal conduct. Yet, despite this violence and criminality, neither
Minnesota intestacy law nor the Uniform Probate Code have any
mechanism which would allow probate courts to consider the his-
tory of violence in the first two scenarios. Only when the violence
reaches the level of murder does it command the attention of family
property law.30
In scenario #1, for example, despite a clear record of physical
abuse and violence, John is entitled to a substantial portion, if not
all, of Jane's probate property under both Minnesota law and the
Uniform Probate Code.31 In distributing the property to John the
poses, an adopted individual becomes part of the adopting family and is no longer
part of the natural family." Id. at Comment Subsection (b). Thus, although adoption
theoretically provides a possible remedy for someone like Eric, as a practical matter
it is unlikely that adoption is a viable solution for most children who are victims of
family violence.
29. This scenario is loosely based on the landmark case of Riggs v. Palmer, 22
N.E. 188 (1889). In Riggs, the grandson of the decedent was charged and convicted
of the decedent's murder. Id. at 189. The court concluded that the grandson was
barred as a matter of equity from taking any benefit due to his own wrongful acts.
Id. at 189-90. See also infra part 11I.C.1. (discussing the significance of the case).
30. See infra part III.C.1. (discussing slayer statutes).
31. Depending on whether the decedent has any surviving children, the surviv-
ing spouse's share may be increased or decreased. See MnN. STAT. § 524.2-102
(1993) ("[tlhe intestate share of the surviving spouse is... if there is no surviving
issue of the decedent, the entire intestate estate"). The UPC, however, makes provi-
sion for surviving parents of a decedent without children. See UPC § 2-102 (1990)
[Vol. 13:401
1995] FAMILY VIOLENCE AND FAMILY PROPERTY 409
probate court considers nothing beyond the legal existence of the
marital relationship. The only issue for the court is the amount of
his inheritance-not whether he is or should be entitled to the
property. Even marital separation has no legal effect on intestate
succession and is not considered by the court.8 2 Only a final di-
vorce 33 or the felonious killing 4 of Jane by John would terminate
his intestate rights to Jane's estate.3 5 Thus, family violence that
does not reach the level of homicide is ignored by family property
law. Instead, intestacy statutes presume that Jane would intend
for her property to be distributed to her legal family - including
her violent and abusive husband. As they currently stand, inheri-
tance laws provide no mechanism for considering family violence.
Legislatures and policy makers have deemed family violence
irrelevant.
("[t]he intestate share of a decedent's surviving spouse is: (2) the first [$200,000],
plus three-fourths of any balance of the intestate estate, if no descendant of the dece-
dent survives the decedent, but a parent of the decedent survives the decedent"). If
Jane died leaving neither surviving descendants nor surviving parents, then John
would be entitled to Jane's entire estate under the UPC. See UPC § 2-102 (1Xi)
(1990). Under Minnesota law, if the decedent has surviving children, the surviving
spouse is still entitled to a substantial portion of the decedent's estate, but less than
the entire estate. See Minn. Stat. § 524.2-102 (1993) ("[tlhe intestate share of the
surviving spouse is .. . if there are surviving issue all of whom are issue of the
surviving spouse also, the first $70,000, plus one-half of the balance of the intestate
estate"). Under the UPC, however, the surviving spouse would be entitled to the
entire estate if the only surviving descendants of the decedent were also descendants
of the surviving spouse. See UPC § 2-102 (1)ii) (1990) ("[tlhe intestate share of a
decedent's surviving spouse is: ... the entire intestate estate if: ... all of the dece-
dent's surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse and there
is no other descendant of the surviving spouse who survives the decedent").
32. MIN. STAT. § 524.2-802 (1993); UPC § 2-802 (1990) (stating that 'lain indi-
vidual who is divorced from the decedent or whose marriage to the decedent has
been annulled is not a surviving spouse.. ." and that "[a] decree of separation that
does not terminate the status of husband and wife is not a divorce for purposes of
this section").
33. See Mngi. STAT. § 524.2-802, supra note 32; UPC § 2-802, supra note 32.
34. See MmN STAT. § 524.2-803 (a) (1993). This statute, known as a "slayer stat-
ute," provides that only "[a] surviving spouse, heir or devisee who feloniously and
intentionally kills the decedent" is deprived of his or her property rights in the dece-
dent's estate. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, a negligent, accidental or other killing
that is deemed unintentional is not covered by this statute. The UPC requires the
same degree of intent for the killer's interest in the decedent's estate to be revoked or
forfeited. See UPC § 2-803 (b) (1990). See also infra part III.C.1. (discussing slayer
statutes).
35. Once a favored relationship, such as marriage, is recognized by the probate
court, there is virtually no way to alter or terminate the intestacy presumptions.
Although one can avoid the intestacy scheme by writing a will, even a will cannot
accomplish the complete disinheritance of an abusive spouse. See infra part III.E.
(discussing the statutory provisions which intervene to protect a spouse from disin-
heritance as well as socio-economic and other factors which influence an individual's
ability and motivation to write a will).
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Similarly, in scenario #2, Eric's estate is subject to the same
prescriptive and invariable intestate succession laws. Because Eric
had no legal wife and no issue, intestacy law provides that his en-
tire estate passes to his parents.3 6 The court may not consider the
history of abuse by the very parents who stand to benefit. The fact
that Eric's parents failed fundamentally in their fiduciary duties as
parents, to the extent that Eric's welfare could only be guaranteed
by removing him from his home, is not considered.
In scenario #3, however, the law is finally willing to consider
the criminal behavior of the beneficiary, Ted. Under a so-called
"slayer statute,"37 Minnesota law provides that the "surviving
spouse, heir or devisee who feloniously and intentionally kills the
decedent is not entitled to any benefits under the will or under this
article, and the estate of decedent passes as if the killer had prede-
ceased the decedent."38 Thus, in Ted's case, the law shows a will-
ingness to open its eyes and examine the behavior of the
beneficiary, but only when it can no longer ignore his behavior -
when in fact, it is the beneficiary's act of violence that triggers the
laws of succession. 39
The law's approach to the third scenario seems demonstrably
correct. Common sense and equity dictate that Ted should not ben-
efit from his criminal acts, especially where murder is involved. 40
For these and other reasons, slayer statutes operate to deny the
killer any property interests in the decedent's estate.41 Under a
36. See MI-N. STAT. § 524.2-103 (1993). The statute provides that "[the part of
the intestate estate not passing to the surviving spouse... or the entire intestate
estate if there is no surviving spouse, passes as follows: (1) to the issue of the dece-
dent .... (2) if there is no surviving issue, to the parent or parents equally." Id. See
also UPC § 2-103 (1990) (same).
37. See supra note 34 and infra part III.C.1.
38. MINN. STAT. § 524.2-803 (a) (1993).
39. See generally Mary Louise Fellows, The Slayer Rule: Not Solely a Matter of
Equity, 71 IowA L. REv. 489 (1986) (discussing slayer rule as necessary to preserve
the integrity of the property transfer scheme).
40. In fact, the perception of inequity in allowing a murderer to benefit from the
murder which he committed, motivated by that benefit, is the oldest rationale for
slayer statutes. See id. at 492-93. Although other important policy reasons for ter-
minating a killer's property interest in the decedent's estate have been demon-
strated, equity remains a compelling consideration in this area of the law. See id. at
494-96 (discussing other rationales for the adoption of slayer statutes).
Indeed, equity underlies more recent criminal anti-profit or "Son of Sam" laws in
effect in many states which prohibit a convicted murderer from collecting any profits
from the publication or sale of the rights to his or her story. See, e.g., ALA. CODE
§ 41-9-80 (1991); CAL Civ. CODE § 2225 (West Supp. 1994); MnNt. STAT. § 611A.68
(1992); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 632-a (1994 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 949.165) (West Supp. 1994).
For a detailed analysis of these criminal antiprofit laws, see Sue S. Okuda, Criminal
Antiprofit Laws: Some Thoughts in Favor of Their Constitutionality, 76 CAL. L. REv.
1353 (1988).
41. See supra note 34 and infra part III.C.1.
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slayer statute like that in Minnesota, the property will pass as if
Ted had pre-deceased his grandmother.42 Ted will not be able to
take under his grandmother's will. The statutory scheme works
well in Ted's case where a greed-motivated killing is involved be-
cause it both furthers donative intent4s and conforms to social ide-
als of deterrence, equity and justice.4 4 Yet where the violence falls
short of murder, the law has so far failed to serve adequately either
of these objectives. Current standards neither attempt to discover
the decedent's likely intent, nor do they apply a strict standard to
abusive conduct. Instead, they ignore both.
As the law now functions, an intestate victim of family vio-
lence is presumed to intend that his or her property pass to the
abuser until the moment of death at the hands of the abuser. To
illustrate the point: while the fatal blow is coming down upon the
victim, the abuser's right to family property is intact. When the
blow strikes and kills (only if it strikes and kills) is the abuser's
inheritance right terminated, either because the decedent's intent
is presumed to have suddenly shifted, or because the beneficiary's
conduct has reached a point that the law cannot comfortably ignore.
Regardless of the asserted rationale, however, the law presently
takes an interest in the beneficiary's behavior only at the moment
of death and not sooner. No matter how many blows have been
struck before, until one is fatal the law is indifferent. Given the
prevalence and gravity of family violence, this current threshold for
the forfeiture of inheritance rights is intolerably high.
These hypothetical cases demonstrate the need for a family
property scheme that requires probate courts to consider evidence
42. See MnN. STAT. § 524.2-803(a) (1993) ("A surviving spouse, heir or devisee
who feloniously and intentionally kills the decedent is not entitled to any benefits
under the will or under this article, and the estate of decedent passes as if the killer
had predeceased the decedent").
The UPC reaches the same result but uses language of revocation. See UPC § 2-
803(c) (1993) ("The felonious and intentional killing of the decedent: (1) revokes any
revocable (i) disposition or appointment of property made by the decedent to the
killer in a governing instrument .... ."); UPC § 2-803(e) (1993) ("Provisions of a gov-
erning instrument are given effect as if the killer disclaimed all provisions revoked
by this section or, in the case of a revoked nomination in a fiduciary or representa-
tive capacity, as if the killer predeceased the decedent").
43. See infra part I1A. (discussing the goal of honoring the decedent's intent to
the greatest extent possible).
44. Even in the context of intentional killing, however, some argue that current
family property laws and specifically slayer statutes are less than ideal. For an in-
depth discussion on the problems of mercy killings, see Jeffery G. Sherman, Mercy
Killing and the Right to Inherit, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 803, 808 (1993) (asserting that
the law of wills need not exactly parallel the criminal law and that "the slayer rule
should not be applied in cases of mercy killing or assisted suicide, even if the crimi-
nal law continues to regard such actions as unlawful").
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of family violence. As discussed in detail below, the adoption of the
family violence statute would serve both a greater effectuation of a
decedent's likely intent and further the important public policy
goals of condemning and deterring family violence.
II. The Proposed Reform
In light of the compelling policy reasons to address family vio-
lence in the context of family property law, the next step is con-
structing a viable statutory standard. Such a standard should
further the public interest in condemning and deterring family vio-
lence without violating any rights of the abuser.45 This article as-
serts that both can be accomplished by adopting the proposed
family violence statute.46
A. The Proposed Family Violence Statute
The proposed family violence statute would protect the estates
of family violence victims such as Jane,47 Eric48 and others whose
abuse and suffering are currently ignored. Under the proposed
statute, the property rights of an abuser in the decedent's estate are
forfeited where family violence committed by the abuser against the
decedent is shown. The proposed statute creates two standards for
determining whether family violence is present: the first is applica-
ble to family violence committed against the decedent while an
adult; the second applies to family violence committed against the
decedent while the decedent was a minor. Under both standards,
the court's inquiry is limited to only certain specified records of fam-
ily violence. In addition, the benefits that are forfeited under the
family violence statute are more limited than those forfeited under
slayer statutes.
1. Forfeiture of Statutory Benefits
Under the proposed statute, an individual who is found to
have committed family violence against the decedent loses certain
statutory inheritance interests in the decedent's estate. The pro-
posed statute states:
An individual who commits family violence against the dece-
dent forfeits the following benefits with respect to the dece-
45. For purposes of this article and the proposed family violence statute, an
abuser "is any family member of the decedent who commits family violence against
the decedent...." Proposed Family Violence Statute, subd. (a), infra at appendix A.
46. The full text of the proposed family violence statute is provided infra at ap-
pendix A.
47. See supra part I.B. and note 26 (scenario #1).
48. See supra part I.B. (scenario #2).
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dent's estate: an intestate share, an elective share, an omitted
spouse's or child's share, a homestead allowance, exempt prop-
erty, and a family allowance. The decedent's intestate estate
passes as if the abuser disclaimed his for her] intestate share.4 9
This section defines what property rights are forfeited under the
proposed statute. All of the benefits subject to forfeiture5o are stat-
utorily conferred benefits. As such, the primary purpose behind the
proposed family violence statute - the condemnation and deter-
rence of family violence by refusing to give the state's imprimatur
to perpetrators of family violence - can only be effectuated by re-
quiring forfeiture of all statutory inheritance benefits.
With respect to decedents who die intestate, the proposed stat-
ute operates to forfeit the abuser's intestacy interest as well as the
option of taking an elective share or the other statutory rights listed
above.51 When the decedent leaves a will which disinherits an abu-
sive spouse or child, the proposed statute operates to override omit-
ted spouse and omitted child shares.5 2 This provision honors the
intent of the victim of family violence who took actions to disinherit
the abuser. Overriding omitted spouse and omitted child provisions
is justified where family violence is present because it furthers both
the donative intent of the decedent, as well as the public interest in
deterring family violence.53 Moreover, the traditional rationales for
omitted spouse or child provisions are weak where family violence
exists. The state's concern for a spouse omitted from the decedent's
will or a child who is unintentionally disinherited is outweighed by
the evidence of family violence indicating contrary intent, as well as
outweighed by policies to condemn family violence.54 Where the de-
49. Proposed Family Violence Statute, subd. (b), infra at appendix A. This sec-
tion is adapted from the forfeiture section of the UPC's slayer statute. See UPC § 2-
803 (b) (1990).
50. For specific examples of statutory provisions establishing the benefits subject
to forfeiture under the proposed family violence statute, see UPC § 2-202 (1990)
(elective share); UPC § 2-301 (1990) (omitted spouse); UPC § 2-302 (1990) (omitted
children); UPC § 2-402 (1990) (homestead allowance); UPC § 2-403 (1990) (exempt
property); and UPC § 2-404 (1990) (family allowance).
51. See supra text accompanying note 49.
52. Under the UPC, a surviving spouse is protected from disinheritance due to a
premarital will. See UPC § 2-301 (1990). A surviving spouse who is intentionally
disinherited and is not the victim of a premarital will is also protected via a forced or
elective share right. See UPC § 2-202 (1990). See also UPC, Part 2: Elective Share of
Surviving Spouse, General Comment 73-74 (1983). The UPC also protects omitted
children in certain situations. See UPC § 2-302.
53. See infra part III.A.-B. (discussing the ideal of honoring the decedent's likely
intent and the public policy interests in deterring and condemning family violence as
powerful rationales for adopting the proposed reform).
54. "In American law, the decedent's spouse is the only relative favored by a pro-
tection against intentional disinheritance. The decedent's children and possibly
more remote descendants are granted protection only against unintentional disin-
heritance." WAGGONER ET AT., supra note 2, at 464.
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cedent suffered family violence committed by the surviving spouse
or child and has manifested an intent to disinherit the abuser,
there is no longer any reason to ignore the decedent's intent and
allow the abuser to benefit. When family, violence is shown, the
public policy interest shifts. The ideal of providing an economic
safety net for a surviving spouse or child is supplanted by the neces-
sity of condemning the family violence committed by the spouse or
child.
It is also important to note that the proposed family violence
statute does not go as far in the forfeiture of property as the Uni-
form Probate Code's slayer statute, upon which it is largely based.55
Under the slayer statute, an individual who feloniously and inten-
tionally kills the decedent also loses powers of appointment con-
ferred on the killer by the decedent, as well as some trust interests,
any interests in property held by the killer and the decedent as
joint tenants, and other property and fiduciary interests. 56 Because
of the lesser culpability of an abuser who does not kill, the proposed
family violence statute is less extreme in its sanctions. In addition,
the proposed family violence statute does not override express tes-
tamentary gifts to the abuser by the decedent. Thus, even where
evidence of violence is present, the proposed family violence statute
will not result in a forfeiture of the abuser's property where the de-
cedent has left a will in which property is given to the abuser. Just
as the proposed statute honors the decedent's intent where he or
she leaves a will disinheriting the abuser, it honors the testamen-
tary intent to pass property despite the infliction of family violence.
2. Inquiry Limited to Court Records
When determining whether a family member of the decedent
committed acts of family violence against the decedent, the pro-
posed statute limits the scope of the court's inquiry to existing civil
or criminal records of the benefitting family members. For exam-
ple, the statute does not permit the court to solicit testimony re-
garding the nature of the relationship between the decedent and
any family member. The court may only consider records of convic-
tions, arrests, or issuances of orders for protection to the extent that
they document incidents of violence against the decedent perpe-
trated by the abuser.
The scope of the inquiry under the proposed family violence
statute is purposefully more limited than under other abuse ori-
55. See UPC § 2-803 (1990).
56. See id. at subd. (c) (revocation of benefits under governing instrument).
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ented statutes, such as Minnesota's domestic homicide statute.5 7
Where homicide is involved, there is a stronger justification for con-
sidering any and all evidence of family violence which possibly led
to the killing. The proposed family violence statute, however,
would apply only to cases where the decedent's death was not
caused by the abuser. The lesser culpability of the abuser requires
a higher threshold for the loss of the property interest.
3. Past Pattern of Abuse Required for Family Violence
Against the Decedent While an Adult
When the family violence was committed by the abuser
against the decedent while the decedent was an adult, the proposed
statute requires that a pattern of abuse against the decedent be
shown. The statute provides that:
Commitment of family violence resulting in forfeiture under
section (b) is established:
(1) by a past pattern of family violence committed by the
abuser against the decedent within [5] years of the decedent's
death when the family violence is committed against the dece-
dent while the decedent was an adult. A pattern can be estab-
lished only by (i) court documents showing a conviction of the
abuser for family violence against the decedent; (ii) arrest of the
abuser for family violence against the decedent; or (iii) an issu-
ance of an order for protection on behalf of the decedent against
the abuser.58
The pattern standard is modeled after the "past pattern of domestic
abuse" standard employed in Minnesota's domestic homicide stat-
ute.59 This standard does not require a specified number of inci-
dents. Instead, it focuses on the relationship among such incidents,
and their connection in time which creates a pattern. 60
The proposed statute also ensures that relatively minor or iso-
lated and remote instances of abuse will not be sufficient to deprive
a beneficiary of his or her property interest in the decedent's estate.
Only the specified records (of conviction, arrests or issuances of or-
57. See DoMEsTic HOMICEDE STATUTE, supra note 6 (1992) (permitting the court
to consider domestic abuse which "constitutes a violation of" domestic abuse stat-
utes. The language of violation encompasses behavior which never resulted in arrest
or any other legal action, but which nevertheless constitutes a de facto violation of
the statutory standard).
58. See Proposed Family Violence Statute, subd. (cXl), infra at appendix A.
59. See DomrsTic Hobucm. STATUTE, supra note 6, at subd. (6) (1992) (charging
with first degree murder anyone who "causes the death of a human being.., while
committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of
domestic abuse upon the victim and the death occurs under circumstances manifest-
ing an extreme indifference to human life").
60. See infra part II.B. 1. (discussing void-for-vagueness challenges to other stat-
utes employing a pattern standard).
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ders for protection) within the specified period ([51 years prior to the
decedent's death) which establish a pattern of violence 6 ' would acti-
vate the statute. Thus, records establishing a pattern of violence
outside the statutory period or a paucity of records within the statu-
tory period would not result in forfeiture. This allows for the possi-
bility that the abuser and the decedent may have reconciled, sought
counseling or treatment, and the violence ended.6 2 This approach
furthers the goal of condemning family violence while acknowledg-
ing and supporting the efforts of those who have succeeded in con-
fronting and conquering the problem.
4. Special Standard for Family Violence Against the
Decedent While a Minor
The proposed statute creates a stricter standard for forfeiture
where child abuse is involved. Public policy demands this result
because of the clear abuse of trust and the ripple effects throughout
later adult life of abuse suffered as a child.63 Thus, to better protect
the most vulnerable victims of family violence and to send a clear
message to child abusers, the proposed statute states that:
Commitment of family violence resulting in forfeiture under
section (b) is established...
(2) by court documents when family violence is commit-
ted against the decedent while the decedent was a minor. Court
documents must show (i) a conviction for family violence by the
abuser against the decedent while the decedent was a minor;
(ii) action by governmental authorities to protect the decedent
from the abuser; or (iii) a tort judgment against the abuser in
favor of the decedent for family violence committed by the
abuser against the decedent while the decedent was a minor.6 4
This standard ensures that evidence of family violence suffered by
the decedent as a child, even if remote from the time of the dece-
dent's death, will still come before the court. However, because of
the remoteness of the abuse, the statute allows only very clear and
61. By definition, a pattern requires more than one incident. See WEBSTER'S
NEW COLLEGIATE DIcTIoN.RY 841 (1977) (defining "pattern" as "a reliable sample of
traits, acts, or other observable features characterizing an individual.") See also in-
fra part II.B.1.
62. The author recognizes that this is not usually the result where family vio-
lence is invorved. Family violence, as a general proposition, is often periodic or cycli-
cal, and thus includes periods of "reconciliation." See TASK FORCE ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 2-3. This is not the type of reconciliation this provision
seeks to accommodate. Rather, this allowance is intended to avoid the unnecessarily
harsh results that can sometimes be produced by rigid and inflexible legal
standards.
63. See infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text (discussing lasting effects of
child abuse).
64. See Proposed Family Violence Statute, subd. (cX2) infra at appendix A.
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highly reliable evidence to effect forfeiture. Only a conviction of the
abuser for family violence against the decedent while a minor,
records of governmental action taken to protect the decedent from
the abuser, or a tort judgment65 in favor of the decedent against the
abuser for family violence committed by the abuser against the de-
cedent while the decedent was a minor would effect forfeiture.
B. Constitutional Issues
If adopted, the proposed family violence statute would provide
a new means of addressing family violence. However, because the
proposed statute may revoke inheritance rights outside the estab-
lished realm of homicide and slayer statutes, it will probably be at-
tacked on several state constitutional grounds. The most
significant challenges are likely to be that the statute (1) employs a
standard that is unconstitutionally vague, and (2) contravenes
prevalent state constitutional provisions forbidding the forfeiture of
a criminal's property upon conviction. Because the proposed stat-
ute incorporates aspects of slayer statutes, which have been widely
adopted despite similar objections, and portions of Minnesota's do-
mestic homicide statute, it is unlikely that such challenges would
succeed.
1. Void-for-Vagueness
If adopted, it is likely that the "pattern" language of the pro-
posed family violence statute would be challenged as unconstitu-
tionally vague. The vagueness doctrine ensures that, as a matter of
due process, a law is not so vague that "[persons] of common intelli-
gence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its ap-
plication."66 The purpose of the doctrine is to invalidate statutes
that either provide insufficient notice as to what type of conduct is
prohibited, or that permit arbitrary and discriminatory enforce-
ment by law enforcement officials.67 Thus, to overcome this chal-
65. Cases of adult victims of child abuse bringing actions against parents and
other family members for the infliction of physical or sexual abuse are becoming
more common. Such actions often involve the use of recovered memories as evi-
dence. See, e.g., Farris v. Compton, 652 A.2d 49 (D.C. 1994); Phillips v. Johnson,
599 N.E.2d 4 (Iil. App. Ct. 1992). Although these actions and the validity and relia-
bility of recovered memories are highly controversial, such suits are nonetheless
highly probative for our purposes in two respects: (1) the intent of the decedent to-
ward the abusive family member is clear, and (2) the judgment itself, if in favor of
the decedent, is fully litigated evidence of the fact of violence.
66. Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). For a gen-
eral discussion of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see LAWRENCE W. TRmE, AME-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-28 (1978).
67. See TRIE, supra note 66, at § 12-28.
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lenge, the proposed family violence statute must demonstrate that
it provides adequate notice of the conduct that would result in for-
feiture and that the standard does not permit undue discretion in
application by the courts. The statute satisfies both of these
requirements.
First, the conduct which would result in forfeiture under the
proposed family violence statute is adequately defined and provides
clear notice of the triggering conduct. The operation of the statute
depends on conduct that is either already unlawful68 or that is the
subject of other statutes or formal procedures. 6 9 In either case, the
prior existence of the statutes and governmental procedures re-
ferred to in the proposed family violence statute ensures that there
is adequate notice. The statute does not define or proscribe any
new standard of conduct.
Second, due to the specificity of what conduct is prohibited
under the statute, the standard does not give the courts unfettered
discretion. The courts may only consider certain conduct and they
must find that such conduct was part of a pattern of abuse and oc-
curred within a specified time prior to the decedent's death.70
Thus, the statute does not create a danger of discriminatory
enforcement.
Additionally, in light of decisions in both state and federal
courts upholding the use of pattern language where the conduct
comprising the pattern is sufficiently defined, precedent indicates
that the pattern standard will likely survive any vagueness chal-
lenge.71 In Minnesota, for example, defendants have already chal-
68. Specifically, the conduct that constitutes the forbidden family violence under.
the proposed statute is the same conduct that is already proscribed and criminalized
as domestic abuse. See Proposed Family Violence Statute, subd. (a)(2), infra at ap-
pendix A (definition of family violence). The statute incorporates the definition of
domestic abuse used in Minnesota's domestic abuse act. See DoMESTic ABUSE ACT,
supra note 24, at § 518B.01, subd. 2(a) ("'Domestic abuse' means: (i) physical harm,
bodily injury, assault, or infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily injury or
assault, between family members; or (ii) terroristic threats, within the meaning of
(citations omitted), or criminal sexual conduct, within the meaning of (citations
omitted), committed against a family or household member by a family or household
member").
69. The issuance of orders for protection, the government's authority to act to
protect a threatened child, or a tort judgment are examples of the other pre-existing
statutory or governmental procedures to which the proposed family violence statute
refers, and which define the scope of the court's inquiry. See Proposed Family Vio-
lence Statute, subd. (c), infra at appendix A.
70. See Proposed Family Violence Statute, subd. (c) (1), infra at appendix A. See
also supra part II.A.3. (discussing the practical application of the proposed family
violence statute's "past pattern" standard).
71. See, e.g., H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989);
State v. Christie, 506 N.W.2d 293 (Minn. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1316 (1994);
People v. Longoria, 862 P.2d 266 (Colo. 1993).
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lenged the "pattern" standard of the state's domestic homicide
statute as unconstitutionally vague. 72 Although the Minnesota
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitutionality of the lan-
guage in the domestic homicide statute,73 the Minnesota high court
did recently hold that the "pattern" standard incorporated in the
state's patterned sex offender statute74 was not unconstitutionally
vague.75 Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the "pattern"
language in a federal RICO statute was sufficiently specific to sur-
vive a vagueness Challenge.76 The Court defined the term "pattern"
at issue in the RICO statute as "an 'arrangement or order of things
or activity,'. . . [iut is not the number of predicates but the relation-
ship that they bear to each other or to some external organizing
principle that renders them 'ordered' or 'arranged.' "77 Thus, the
use of a pattern standard has been recognized as legally cognizable
in other contexts and does not in and of itself present a barrier to
the statute's constitutional validity.
Finally, it is noteworthy that the above vagueness analysis
has traditionally been applied primarily to criminal statutes78 and
laws potentially applicable to protected expression.79 The proposed
family violence statute, however, is not a criminal statute and does
not impose criminal liability. Nor does it address any form of pro-
tected expression. As a civil statute, it would be entitled to greater
72. See Margaret C. Hobday, Note, A Constitutional Response to the Realities of
Intimate Violence: Minnesota's Domestic Homicide Statute, 78 MINN. L. REV. 1285,
1307 (1994) (discussing void-for-vagueness challenges to Minnesota's domestic homi-
cide statute).
73. This article was in press while the Minnesota Supreme Court was reviewing
the state's domestic homicide statute. See State v. Grube, No. C1-94-518.
74. See MINN. STAT. § 609.1352 (Supp. 1994) (patterned sex offenders; special
sentencing provision).
75. See State v. Christie, 506 N.W. 2d. 293 (Minn. 1993.)
The plain language of the statute indicates that the statute afforded
appellant fair warning as to his actions. The patterned sex offender
statute is to be applied if the offender has been convicted of a predatory
crime... and that crime was 'part of a predatory pattern of behavior
that had criminal sexual conduct as its goal.' *** Therefore, we hold
that the statute is not void for vagueness.
Id.
76. See H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 299, 238 (1989).
77. Id. (citing 11 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 357 (2d ed. 1989)).
78. See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (voiding a statute on
vagueness grounds which made it a crime to be a member of a "gang").
79. See TRIBE, supra note 66, at § 12-28 ("[Tlhe Supreme Court requires more
specificity of a statute potentially applicable to expression sheltered by the first
amendment than in other contexts. . . .") (citing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566
(1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)).
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latitude in specificity than if it imposed criminal penalties.SO Thus,
even if the statute for some reason did not satisfy the above analy-
sis, it is still likely to be upheld due to the lesser penalties involved.
2. Forfeiture of Estate and Corruption of Blood
Many states have constitutional provisions prohibiting the for-
feiture of a criminal's property upon conviction.8 1 This policy is
traceable to the old common law doctrines of forfeiture of estate and
corruption of blood.82 These doctrines either deprived a person con-
victed of certain crimes of his property upon conviction, or pre-
vented the person's issue from inheriting from or through that
person.8 3 In either case, the felon's heirs had to suffer the loss of
their property rights. Ultimately, this harsh result spurred the
abolishment of these doctrines.84 In an effort to protect the families
of criminals from the loss of family property and their inheritance
rights, some states adopted constitutional provisions which prohib-
ited the taking of a criminal's property.8 5
These constitutional provisions created some difficulties for
legislatures wishing to adopt slayer statutes, and led to bizarre de-
cisions by courts who reasoned that such provisions and slayer stat-
utes were fundamentally incompatible.8 6 Many states, however,
80. See, e.g., Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952) (up-
holding against a vagueness challenge an ordinance requiring carriers to "avoid, so
far as practicable" "congested" routes).
81. See, e.g., ARK. CoNsT. art. 2, § 17; CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 9; IND. CONST. art. I,
§ 30; NEEB. CoNsT. art. I, § 15.
82. See generally Alison Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty - History of Problem in
Anglo-American Law, 19 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 229 (1942).
83. See Fellows, supra note 39, at 540 (summarizing these doctrines as they per-
tain to the constitutionality of slayer statutes).
84. Id.
85. See supra note 81.
86. See, e.g., Hagan v. Cone, 94. S.E. 602 (Ga. App. 1917); Wall v. Pfanschmidt,
106 N.E. 785 (Ill. 1914); Wilson v. Randolph, 261 P. 654 (Nev. 1927).
In addition to slayer statutes, at least one domestic homicide statute was struck
down for constitutional reasons. Tennessee adopted a domestic homicide statute in
1991. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (1991). Subsequently, however, the stat-
ute was struck down on state constitutional grounds. See State v. Hale, 840 S.W. 2d
307 (Tenn. 1992). The Tennessee legislature, however, responded by amending the
statute. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 39-13-202(a)(4) (Supp. 1994).
The constitutional hurdles for domestic homicide statutes usually involve sev-
eral issues: (1) the expansion of traditional mens rea for first degree murder liability,
(2) void-for-vagueness challenges, and (3) the right to a fair trial. For an in depth
discussion of the constitutional issues involved in domestic homicide statutes, see
Hobday, supra note 72, at 1294-1317. For the most part, these concerns have either
been largely resolved by Minnesota or other courts, or are irrelevant to the proposed
reform. The mens rea concerns, for example, are irrelevant to the proposed family
violence statute because the reform does not seek to define a new crime. Thus, no
mens rea element is required. For a discussion of the vagueness issues, see supra
part II.B.1.
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which have adopted slayer statutes and have confronted this issue
have resolved it in favor of the statute's constitutionality.8 7 Fur-
ther, if the policy behind these constitutional provisions against for-
feiture was to protect innocent family members from the loss of
family property, then this goal is only furthered by the proposed
family violence statute.
Unlike the obsolete doctrines of forfeiture of estate and corrup-
tion of blood, which deprived the felon of all of his or her property,
the proposed statute would only require that the abuser forfeit cer-
tain inheritance interests in the decedent's estate.8 8 Property al-
ready owned by the abuser would not be affected. According to one
scholar, "[a] more sound interpretation of the constitutional
prohibitions against forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood sug-
gests that they apply only when the criminal's entire estate is re-
quired to be forfeited."89 This is not the case under the proposed
family violence statute. Additionally, although it is arguable that
even denying the abuser his or her statutory interests in the dece-
dent's estate could deprive the abuser's heirs of potential property,
this result is unlikely. In family violence situations, it is more
likely that the decedent's heirs are also heirs of the abuser. By
forfeiting the abuser's rights and distributing the property to the
remaining family members of the decedent, the proposed reform
would operate to divert additional property to the non-abusive
heirs, rather than taking it from them. Thus, enduring state consti-
tutional provisions prohibiting forfeiture of estate and corruption of
blood are not likely to be obstacles to the enactment of the proposed
family violence statute.
M. The Rationale for Reform
There are many compelling reasons for adopting the proposed
family violence statute. The statute would, in many cases, further
the decedent's likely donative intent - a major goal of family prop-
erty law. It would also serve as a powerful example of society's col-
lective resolve to condemn family violence. In addition, the family
violence statute's linkage of behavior and property rights is well
supported by other legal precedent. Finally, the proposed family
violence statute would provide a remedy for an injustice which is
currently ignored and for which traditional means of controlling
one's property may be of little, if any, utility.
87. See Fellows, supra note 39, at 538-45.
88. See Proposed Family Violence Statute, subd. (b), infra at appendix A.
89. Fellows, supra note 39, at 543 (emphasis added).
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A The Ideal of Honoring The Decedent's Likely Donative
Intent
The effectuation of the decedent's intent is a major goal of
property law.90 For example, where the decedent has a valid will
the state is obligated to act in accordance with the decedent's ex-
press intent in distributing her property,91 with limited exceptions
such as elective share provisions.92 Further, some states now ex-
cuse technical defects in order to effectuate the decedent's intent, if
the will substantially complies with statutory requirements.93 The
1990 Uniform Probate Code has gone a step further and includes a
provision that would allow courts to dispense with the formal re-
quirements of will execution and focus instead on the decedent's
discernable intent.94 This standard does not even require that for-
90. See UPC § 1-102 (1990). This section, entitled "Purposes; Rule of Construc-
tion" states that "[t]his Code shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its
underlying purposes and policies." § 1-102(a). Among the purposes listed is the de-
sire "to discover and make effective the intent of a decedent in distribution of his
property." § 1-102(bX2).
91. However, where a decedent attempts to create a will but fails to meet all of
the statutory requirements, the decedent's express intent may be ignored entirely
due to a defect in execution. In some instances, the result is that the decedent's will
is declared invalid and the decedent's estate is administered under the laws of intes-
tacy. See, e.g., Estate of McKellar, 380 S.2d 1273 (Miss. 1980) (holding that the dece-
dent's will was statutorily deficient for lack of the decedent's signature and therefore
invalid). See generally WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 2, at 161-248 (discussing the
formalities involved in the execution of wills).
92. Elective share provisions protect the surviving spouse and guarantee a statu-
tory share in the decedent spouse's estate. As such, these provisions will override
even an explicit intent on the part of the decedent to disinherit his or her spouse.
See, e.g., MwI. STAT. § 524.2-201, subd. (a) (1993) ("the surviving spouse has a right
of election to take an elective share ... ."); UPC § 2-202 (1990) (elective share).
93. See, e.g., Will of Ranney, 589 A.2d 1339 (NJ 1991) (upholding a will signed by
the attesting witnesses on the self-proved affidavit rather than on the will itself be-
cause execution substantially complied with statutory requirements). See also UPC
§ 2-502 (pre-1990). This section largely codifies the doctrine of substantial compli-
ance by reducing the formal requirements previously required by the UPC. Id. The
comment following this section notes that "[tihe formalities for execution of a wit-
nessed will have been reduced to a minimum .... The intent is to validate a will
which meets the minimal formal requirements." Id. at comment. The movement
toward the doctrine of substantial compliance was bolstered when it was approved
by the American Law Institute and incorporated into the Restatement 2d of Prop-
erty. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF PROPERTY § 33.1 (1990). "[Tlhe court should
apply a rule of substantial compliance, under which a will is found validly executed if
the document was executed in substantial compliance with the statutory formalities
and if the proponent establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent
intended the document to constitute his or her will." Id. at comment.
94. See UPC § 2-503 (1990) (the formal requirements of will execution may be
dispensed with in the court's discretion "if the proponent of the document or writing
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the decedent intended the docu-
ment or writing to constitute" the decedent's will, or revocation, addition, alteration
or revival thereto). This provision entitled "Writings intended as wills, etc." is com-
monly referred to as the "dispensing power" provision. To date, this provision has
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mal requirements of execution be substantially complied with
where the decedent's intent is clear.95
Intestacy law, however, was developed to accommodate those
who die without a will and thus whose donative intent is not ex-
pressly known to the state. To bridge this gap, intestacy law
adopted a scheme that represented a typical decedent's disposi-
tions.96 Indeed, these dispositions, which favor spouses and lineal
descendants, are deeply ingrained in Anglo-American law.9 7
Although the idea of family has changed over time,98 the tendency
of people to leave their property to their family has remained rather
constant.99 As one noted family law scholar remarked:
[Un Western liberal democracies, intestate succession law is es-
sentially designed to accommodate the needs of the typical de-
cedent. As the law that applies if the decedent did not make
other arrangements for the disposition of his property within
the limits permitted by public policy, it is Everyman's will.1 0 0
So far then, the law has been satisfied to take an approach sup-
ported by statistics and probabilities,O1 confident that the option of
been adopted in two states. See CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-11-503 (1994); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 72-2-523 (1993). According to the comment following the UPC provi-
sion, "Section 2-503 means to retain the intent-serving benefits of Section 2-502 for-
mality without inflicting intent-defeating outcomes in cases of harmless error." UPC
§ 2-503, supra, at comment.
95. See UPC § 2-503 (1990).
96. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 2, at 71. The text excerpts a passage from
an opinion which is representative of this rationale:
The purpose of these statutes... is to provide a distribution of real and
personal property that approximates what decedents would have done
if they had made a will. Spouses and children enjoy a favored position
under the laws of intestate succession because, on statistical average,
they are the natural objects of most peoples' [sic] bounty.
King v. Riffee, 309 S.E.2d 85, 87-88 (W.Va. 1983). See generally Mary Louise Fel-
lows et al., Public Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Suc-
cession Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 321 (reporting that
the presumed dispositions of intestacy law reflect what a large portion of the popula-
tion actually chooses to do when distributing its property).
97. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 2, at 69-71.
98. See MARY ANN GLENDON, TnE NEW FAmIY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 11 (1981)
[hereinafter THa NEW FAmL].
99. See generally Fellows et al., supra note 96.
100. GLENDON, THE NEW FAmILy, supra note 98, at 21. Further, according to
Glendon, the rise in status of the spouse to the point where the spouse is now the
favored beneficiary is nothing short of remarkable. Id. at 22. Glendon notes that
historically, the spouse was largely left out of family property succession, with the
emphasis placed on ascendants and descendants in the direct bloodline. Id. Over
time, the law began to protect the spouse and the spouse gradually acquired a
greater legal interest in the decedent's estate. The culmination of this trend is that
today a surviving spouse is guaranteed a large portion of the decedent's estate. Id.
at 24-25.
101. See generally Fellows et al., supra note 96.
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writing a will offers a viable alternative for those with non-typical
donative intentions.102
But, where the decedent's donative desires are not typical and
the option of writing a will or executing will substitutes are not uti-
lized, 103 this approach clearly fails to achieve its stated goal.
Rather than effectuating the decedent's intent, the law overrides it
and imposes its own "intent" with respect to property distribution.
Saved costs and greater efficiency might justify this approach
where there is little probative evidence of the decedent's intent and
where an unflagging obligation to discover that intent would mire
the court in lengthy investigations into every aspect of the dece-
dent's life. However, where evidence is readily available to the
court that is strongly indicative of the decedent's likely intent, there
is no good reason to ignore this evidence. Such is the case where
family violence is involved.
Instead of assuming and imposing an intent, the proposed
family violence statute would, in essence, require the court to make
sure that the decedent's actual intent was likely to be effectuated by
the intestacy presumptions. In this regard, evidence of family vio-
lence committed against the decedent by a family member must be
viewed as highly probative evidence of the decedent's intent - an
intent not to distribute property to an abusive family member. If
any intent is to be presumed and enforced via statute, it should be
an intent not to pass property to a violent abuser. Thus, like slayer
statutes, the proposed family violence statute should be adopted to
further this intent. Effectuating this intent not to reward an
abuser is both more likely to comport with the decedent's actual
intent as well as with society's collective intent not to condone fam-
ily violence.
B. Public Policy
Society's collective desire to deter and condemn family vio-
lence is well founded. The effects of family violence extend far be-
yond the immediate victim to affect children and others who grow-
up and live in an atmosphere of violence.104 Statistics show that
experiencing or witnessing abuse as a child is the greatest predictor
of later criminal and abusive behavior.105 According to national
law enforcement officials, "[tihe tragedy of family violence goes be-
102. But see infra part 1I1.E. (discussing why the legal ability to write a will is not
necessarily a viable option for many).
103. See Fellows, et al., supra note 96; see also John M. Astrachan, Why People
Don't Make Wills, 118 TR. & ESr. 45 (1979).
104. See TASK FORCE ON FAmY VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 2-3.
105. Id.
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yond the pain of any single episode. The research of the past dec-
ade has demonstrated the frightening degree to which family
violence is cyclical in nature, with violence in one generation beget-
ting violence in the next."106 Public policy regarding this violence,
however, has been expressed almost exclusively through criminal
law.107 Yet given the compelling policy reasons for condemning
family violence on all fronts, the failure of family property law to do
so is intolerable. Further, unless a statute like the proposed family
violence statute is adopted, family property law will continue to un-
wittingly reward perpetrators of family violence by allowing them
to inherit property from the very person they abused.
Additionally, if serving the donative intent of the decedent, as
discussed above, is the only recognized purpose for reform, then
many victims of family violence may not be helped. A solely intent-
based rationale will not support forfeiture of an abuser's inheri-
tance rights where evidence of the decedent's intent is unclear or
seems to be in favor of distribution to an abuser. For example, re-
call Jane from the first scenario discussed above.1OS Jane had the
strength and independence to extract herself from her abusive mar-
riage, seeking the assistance of a shelter and ultimately moving
into her own apartment. In Jane's case the evidence of her intent to
disassociate herself from her husband is very strong. One believes
that but for her untimely death, Jane would have divorced John
and thereby terminated his intestacy rights. Thus, under an intent
based rationale, it is easy for the law to recognize Jane's intent and
deny John his inheritance interest in Jane's estate in order to serve
her intent.
But what if Jane, like many abused women, did not leave?1O9
Many studies have shown that abused women and wives in particu-
lar believe they will be in more danger if they do leave or feel com-
106. Id. at 2.
107. The criminalization of violence across the spectrum, including all forms of
family violence, has been society's primary approach to the problem. In this respect,
much progress has been made, such as the recognition and criminalization of more
subtle and complex types of violence like terroristic threats. See MINN. STAT.
§ 609.713 (1994) (criminalizing terroristic threats); DoMSTIc ABUSE ACT, supra note
24 (including terroristic threats within the definition of domestic abuse).
108. See supra part I.B.
109. The inability of many women to leave an abusive and violent relationship
has come to be known as "battered woman's syndrome." See generally LENORE E.
WALKER, THE BAT=ERED WOMAN SYNDRom (1984). Further, some feminist theorists
posit that women's greater sense of obligation and responsibility regarding family
life explains why they often remain in violent relationships. See Martha R. Maho-
ney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation, 90 MicH.




pelled to stay for economic and family reasons.110 Further, many
such victims may actually desire that the abuser's property rights
be preserved and that no punitive action be taken against their
abuser."'1 To be effective, any reform that seeks to address family
violence must be justified by more than a desire to honor the dece-
dent's intent. The reality is that the decedent's intent may some-
times conflict with the public interest in condemning family
violence.
It is precisely because in many abusive situations evidence of
the victim's donative intent may be lacking or contrary to public
policy that this reform is most needed. Moreover, research suggests
that any apparent intent of a family violence victim to reward the
abuser must be viewed as itself a product of the violence.112 Such
apparent "intent" is more likely a coerced state of mind resulting
from repeated and continued abuse. As a result, honoring such an
"intent" is akin to honoring the intent of the abuser instead of that
of the decedent.
The seriousness of family violence, however, and society's in-
terest in fostering healthy families and a stable community re-
quires that the forfeiture apply in these situations. Thus, even
where the intent of an intestate decedent is unclear or apparently
in favor of the abuser, the public interest in condemning family vio-
lence should be effectuated and the abuser's property rights for-
feited. Only where the decedent has clearly expressed an intent to
pass property to the abuser by will or will substitutes should such
an intent be honored.113
110. See WALKER, supra note 109; Mahoney, supra note 109; Tong, supra note 9.
111. See generally WALKER, supra note 109. See also Tong, supra note 9, at 124-
50 (discussing the psychological syndrome suffered by battered women).
112. See Mahoney, supra note 109, at part III (stating that battering is about
domination which includes a process of separation assault by the abuser who seeks
to dominate the "woman's body and volition."). Id. at 65.
113. While such an intent may still remain troubling for society generally, the
primary problem this article seeks to address is the statutory presumption that an
individual victim of family violence intends for his or her property to pass to the
abuser despite the abuse. This presumption arises when the decedent dies intestate.
In addition, other statutory provisions presume that it is always desirable to protect
a spouse from intentional disinheritance. This presumption is similar to the intes-
tacy presumption and is just as problematic in the context of family violence. Both
approaches work to defeat the intent of the decedent while also contravening the
public interest in condemning family violence by rewarding the abuser with the de-
cedent's property. Each of these situations is addressed by the proposed family vio-
lence statute. When the decedent leaves a valid will which expressly states an
intention to pass property to an abusive family member, however, different issues
are involved. Given that the ideal of donative freedom remains a cornerstone of
property law, only the strongest of rationales is likely to justify overriding a dece-
dent's explicit intent.
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C. Precedent for Linking of Familial Behavior and
Property Rights
In addition to the larger policies that would be served by the
adoption of the proposed family violence statute, there is also
strong precedent for the linking of behavior within the family to
family property rights. The widespread adoption of slayer statutes
and the declining doctrine of abandonment, desertion, or refusal to
support are two significant examples.
1. Slayer Statutes
Currently most states have some form of a slayer statute
which terminates the property rights of beneficiaries who murder
or otherwise intentionally cause the premature death of the dece-
dent."l 4 Although state requirements vary,115 most jurisdictions
follow the example of the Uniform Probate Code which provides
that, "[ain individual who feloniously and intentionally kills the de-
cedent forfeits all benefits under this Article with respect to the de-
cedent's estate, including an intestate share, an elective share, an
omitted spouse's or child's share, a homestead allowance, exempt
property, and a family allowance."116
The slayer rule was first promulgated in New York in the late
eighteenth century in Riggs v. Palmer."17 The court relied on the
equitable doctrine that a person should not benefit from his crimi-
nal acts.' 18 More recently, however, as the slayer rule has been
embraced by state legislatures across the country, it has come to be
viewed as a necessary safeguard of the property transfer system. 119
When the beneficiary's criminal act of homicide is viewed as a dis-
ruption of the property transfer scheme, the state has an interest in
punishing such action in order to preserve its own order. According
to one family law scholar, killings motivated by greed,
potentially interrupt the normal disposition of property in three
ways: the killings cause the victims to lose personal enjoyment
of their property; the killings may deny the victims the opportu-
114. See, e.g., A1.AsKA STAT. § 13.11.305 (1994); ALA. CODE § 43-8-253 (1994); CAL.
PROB. CODE § 250 (Deering 1995); IDAHo CODE § 15-2-803 (1994); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. Tit. 18-A, § 2-803 (West 1994); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-803 (1994); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 72-2-813 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 45-2-803 (Michie 1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 62-2-803 (Law. Co-op 1993).
115. See, e.g., Aaa. STAT. § 28-11-204 (1994) (requiring a conviction to precipitate
forfeiture); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.5251 (Callaghan 1993) (allowing court to make
independent inquiry into beneficiaries intent etc.).
116. UPC § 2-803 (b) (1990).
117. 22 N.E. 188 (1889). See also supra note 29 and part III.C.1.
118. Riggs, 22 N.E. 188, at 190.
119. See generally, Fellows, supra note 39.
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nity to change their existing estate plans; and the killings inter-
fere with the order of death of the victims and the slayers,
placing property transfers conditioned on survivorship in jeop-
ardy of being controlled by surviving slayers. 120
Thus, whether or not one subscribes to the equitable and moral jus-
tifications for the doctrine and their place in the law, it seems clear
that the harms from such conduct extend beyond the moral realm.
When a beneficiary kills to obtain property the fabric of government
authority and regulation is interfered with and disrupted.
With respect to family violence, however, the non-equitable ra-
tionale is less clear. Unlike in slayer situations, where the pro-
posed family violence statute would apply, the deaths are not
caused by the abuser. Thus, there is no parallel interference with
the property transfer scheme. Nevertheless, to the extent that the
law of intestacy is designed to serve the following purposes, the vio-
lence is problematic: first, if intestate statutes are intended to
mimic the most likely disposition of the intestate's property yet
they ignore evidence probative of the intestate's donative intent,
the intent-honoring objective is not being served; second, if, as has
historically been the case, inheritance rights are intended to reflect
societal values and favored familial behavior,121 the systematic ig-
norance of family violence is both disturbing as a social model and
contradictory to the objectives of the law in other areas.
At its core, the proposed reform simply transposes the policies
behind the widely promulgated slayer statutes into the context of
family violence. While the equitable doctrine underlying the slayer
statutes is relevant to this inquiry,12 2 the proposed family violence
statute focuses on the function of intestacy statutes as a proxy for
the intestate's most likely donative intent as well as the law's func-
tion as a primary sculptor of societal attitudes and behavioral
norms.
2. Abandonment, Desertion or Refusal to Support
As discussed above, the law of succession is primarily con-
cerned with the effectuation of the decedent's intent to the extent it
is discernable.123 While the law has demonstrated a willingness to
override the decedent's intent in order to protect family mem-
bers,124 it has also shown a willingness to examine the behavior of
120. Id. at 493.
121. See GLENDoN, supra note 3. See also WAGGO NER ET AL., supra note 2.
122. See Fellows, supra note 39, at 490-91 (discussing and evaluating the histori-
cal reliance on equity as the primary justification for slayer statutes).
123. See supra part III.A.
124. For example, elective share provisions protect the surviving spouse from dis-
inheritance by guaranteeing a statutory share in the decedent spouse's estate.
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the beneficiary. For example, in a few jurisdictions spousal rights
to the decedent's estate depend on the surviving spouse's behavior
toward the decedent.125 In these jurisdictions, statutes creating
spousal rights in a decedent spouse's estate "also include express
provisions excluding from the benefits, a spouse who has been
guilty of specified misconduct, usually including as a ground of for-
feiture, abandonment or desertion."126
The Uniform Probate Code, however, has rejected this ap-
proach, as have most states. 127 Under the Uniform Probate Code
adultery, abandonment and other behavioral standards are no
longer grounds for terminating spousal property rights.128 Only di-
vorce or the killing of one's spouse will terminate spousal property
rights.129 Thus, as the comment to the Uniform Probate Code pro-
vision regarding the "Effect of Divorce, Annulment, and Decree of
Separation" explains, "the present section requires some definitive
legal act to bar the surviving spouse. Normally this is divorce."130
As a result, violent and abusive behavior by one spouse toward an-
other is unavailable as a grounds for terminating spousal property
rights under the Uniform Probate Code. While the trends that led
to the widespread repeal of subjective behavioral standards are pro-
gressive in many ways, it does not necessarily follow that all stan-
dards for considering the behavior of the surviving spouse or other
beneficiaries should be eliminated. Many of the policy reasons be-
hind these old standards remain compelling in the context of family
violence.
A primary distinction between these old behavioral standards
and that of the proposed family violence statute is that the former
restrictions applied only to the surviving spouse of a decedent and
not to other family members. This probably resulted from the fact
that "[in American law, the decedent's spouse is the only relative
These provisions will override even an explicit intent on the part of the decedent to
disinherit his or her spouse. See, e.g., MmN. STAT. § 524.2-201 (1993) ("the surviving
spouse has a right of election to take an elective share ... ."). § 524.2-201 (a); UPC
§ 2-202 (1990) (elective share). See also generally WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 2, at
464.
125. E.L. Strobin, Annotation, Abandonment, Desertion, or Refusal to Support on
Part of Surviving Spouse as Affecting Marital Rights in Deceased Spouse's Estate, 13
ALR3d 446, 449 (1994).
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., UPC § 2-802 (1990) and comment following (discussing the effect of
divorce, annulment, and a degree of separation on spousal property rights under the
UPC and commenting that normally only an act which affects the spouse's legal sta-
tus as a spouse will suffice to terminate spousal property rights).
128. Id.
129. Id. See also, supra part III.C.1.
130. UPC § 2-802 (1990) at comment.
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favored by a protection against intentional disinheritance.131
Thus, the greater protection provided to the surviving spouse came
at the price of loyalty to the decedent. In so far as this continues to
be the case, revocation of spousal rights is best analyzed under con-
fidential relationship theory discussed below. 132
The absence of historical restrictions on the behavior of other
family members with respect to the decedent, however, takes on
new significance where family violence is involved. As noted above,
the current intestacy scheme modeled in the Uniform Probate Code
does not protect the decedent's children or other relatives of the de-
cedent from intentional disinheritance. 133  Yet it presently
presumes an intent on the part of the decedent to pass property to
abusive family members who, but for the decedent's lack of a will,
could otherwise be completely disinherited. It is ironic that what
family property law will allow by the explicit expression of the dece-
dent's intent (i.e. the intentional disinheritance of family members'
other than the surviving spouse, for any reason or no reason), it will
not presume even where there is evidence of family violence - be-
havior which contravenes compelling public policy interests. Re-
call, for example, the second scenario discussed above involving
Eric and his girlfriend Becky.i34 Although Eric could have disin-
herited his parents entirely and for any reason, had he left a will,
they will nevertheless be entitled to a portion of his estate despite
their abuse of him because their behavior is not currently consid-
ered a part of the family property equation.
D. Other Relevant Precedents Supporting the Proposed
Family Violence Statute
The proposed statute is also supported by more recent and in-
novative approaches to legal problems. Confidential relationship
theory, traditionally a means of policing economic transactions, 135
reinforces the need for reform when applied in the context of family
violence. Additionally, Minnesota's progressive domestic homicide
statute also serves as a valuable model of reform spurred by a com-
prehensive understanding of the nature of family violence.
131. See WAGGONER ET AL., supra note 2, at 464.
132. See text infra part III.D.1.
133. Both Minnesota law and the UPC, however, provide a remedy for the unin-
tentional disinheritance of the decedent's children. See MIN. STAT. § 524.2-302
(1993) (pretermitted children); UPC § 2-302 (1990) (omitted children).
134. See supra part I.B. (scenario #2).
135. For a general discussion of the common law doctrine of confidential relation-
ship, see 4 G. PALMER, TmE LAw OF REsTrTTioN, §§ 19.2-3 (1978).
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1. Confidential Relationship Theory
An issue related to the behavioral standards discussed above
is the existence of a confidential relationship16 between spouses
and family members. Because of this special relationship, the mere
existence of criminal laws and penalties to deal with family violence
is not a sufficient response. Unlike an assault between strangers,
there is more involved in family violence than just violence. Family
members stand in a fiduciary and confidential relationship to each
other. This is especially true in the parent-child context where a
parent is legally liable for the welfare of his or her children. 137
Such a fiduciary relationship also exists between spouses.138
Indeed, in these situations the abusers, as family members, are in a
class of persons entitled to special rights not extended to friends,
intimates and other non-family members.13 9 Succession law has
chosen to confer special rights and benefits to individuals who par-
ticipate in a traditional family.140 These benefits are undoubtedly a
form of reward or incentive for individuals who engage in behavior
and assume responsibilities favored by the state - monogamy,
marriage and child rearing. When viewed from this perspective, it
becomes apparent that to address only the criminal aspect of family
violence (i.e. the violence itself) is to ignore the breach of duty and
special relationships involved - relationships encouraged and re-
warded by society generally. Given the special rights of family priv-
ilege, it seems only appropriate to demand that the law address the
behavior of those who not only violate the criminal law, but the
public policy interests in healthy and stable family environments.
To the extent then, that the system is successively seeking out
and punishing familial abusers under the criminal law as it would
136. Black's Law Dictionary defines the confidential relation as, "[a] fiduciary re-
lation... which exists between... parent and child,... ancestor and heir,...
husband and wife." BLAcK's LAw DCTIONARY 298 (6th ed. 1990). It summarizes the
legal doctrine of confidential relationship, stating that "the law, in order to prevent
undue advantage from the unlimited confidence or sense of duty which the relation
naturally creates, requires the utmost degree of good faith in all transactions be-
tween the parties." Id.
137. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & Aus'rnq W. Scorr, CamuAL LAw § 3.3 (a) (1), at
203-04 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing common law affirmative duties to act based upon
certain relationships to other persons, including the duty of parents to aid, protect
and otherwise take reasonable steps to care for their children).
138. Id. See also Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, Guilty of the Crime of
Trust: Nonstranger Rape, 75 MmN. L. Rxv. 599, 601 (1991) (asserting the need for
the application of confidential relationship theory to cases of nonstranger rape in
order to overcome difficulties in the prosecution of such cases).




in a non-family context, the criminal law is doing its job.141 Yet to
the extent that we do not address the breach of fiduciary duty also
involved, we are failing to attack the entire problem. To punish the
behavior in one context, yet ignore it in another context specifically
designed to encourage families and support familial relationships is
difficult to reconcile. Law enforcement officials themselves have
stressed the need for a more expansive attack on family violence.
The U.S. Attorney General's Office has stated that "[i]ntervention
in family violence cases cannot be limited to the criminal justice
system. There must be a strong, coordinated effort by the criminal
justice system, victim assistance agencies and the entire
community."142
2. Minnesota's Domestic Homicide Statute
Aware of and concerned about family violence, Minnesota leg-
islators in 1990 voted to amend the first degree murder statute to
include liability for anyone who "causes the death of a human being
... while committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has en-
gaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim and the
death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indiffer-
ence to human life."143 The statute reflects an unusual and aggres-
sive approach to the problem of family violence in that it imposes
first degree liability for extreme recklessness rather than intent to
kill,144 the traditional standard for first degree murder liability. 145
The statute "presumes intent based on a number of factors, includ-
ing the victim-defendant relationship and the defendant's repeated
abuse of the victiM."146 The statute is important, however, not be-
cause it presumes intent based on other behavior, 14 7 but because it
141. There is evidence, however, to suggest that even on this front family violence
is not being adequately acknowledged and prosecuted. See, e.g., O'Doherty & Wolf-
son, supra note 11.
142. TASK FORCE ON FAmILy VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 5-6.
143. DoMiEsTic HOMICmE STATUTE, supra note 6, at subd. (6).
144. Few jurisdictions have adopted domestic homicide statutes. Other jurisdic-
tions which have taken this approach include Washington and Tennessee. See
WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.32.055 (1988) (imposing first degree liability where the de-
fendant is shown to have "previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or
torture" of the victim); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-202(aX4) (1991) (amended in 1993)
(imposing first degree liability where it is shown that the "death result[ed] from one
or more incidents of a protracted pattern or multiple incidents" of abuse).
145. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 137 (discussing traditional mens rea re-
quirements and standard for traditional murder liability).
146. See Hobday, supra note 72, at 1286.
147. The criminal law already recognizes that intent may be inferred from other
acts. For example, felony murder statutes impose first degree murder liability
where the defendant was engaging in felonious conduct and the death was foresee-
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infers intent from the abusive relationship between the defendant
and the victim - the "past pattern of domestic abuse."148
Although other states have been slow to follow Minnesota's
progressive lead, the domestic homicide statute still serves as a val-
uable example of the viability of a more vigorous family violence
policy and the need for new approaches to the problem. In addition,
the domestic homicide statute implicitly recognizes two important
aspects of family violence that are otherwise largely ignored by cur-
rent approaches to the problem: first, that family violence is a pro-
cess and thus it is the pattern of abuse that must be addressed by
the law, regardless of the number or severity of the individual acts
forming the pattern; and second, that family violence is a crime of
trust as well as of violence - that is, such violence is arguably
more disturbing than violence among strangers precisely because of
the existence of a confidential relationship between the victim and
the abuser. The domestic homicide statute's use of a pattern stan-
dard as well as the imposition of greater liability upon family mem-
bers who abuse to the point of death marks the beginning of an new
approach to family violence. This more informed understanding of
family violence is incorporated in the proposed family violence
statute.
E. Writing a Disinheriting Will or Seeking Divorce From
the Abuser: False Solutions to the Problem of
Family Violence
Related to the need for a more informed understanding of the
complexity of family violence, is the additional need to recognize
that traditional methods for handling property disposition are inad-
equate where family violence is present. Just as family violence is
more than a crime of violence, family property distribution involves
more than matters of property. For example, one might question
why the ability to write a disinheriting will is not an adequate rem-
edy for an abused family member. The answer to this question is
not simply a matter of the decedent's intent.
While every competent adult has the power to write a will,
there are many intervening forces that may either prevent the writ-
ing of a will or partially defeat it, even if written and otherwise
valid.149 One study showed that sixty-five percent of individuals
able. See, e.g., Domestic Homicide Statute, supra note 6, subd. (3). See generally
LAFAvE & ScOrr, supra note 137, at § 2.13, § 7.5.
148. DoMEsTic HomcmE STATuTE, supra note 6, at subd. (6).
149. Current statutory provisions, such as a spouse's right to an elective share
and omitted spouse provisions, operate to defeat such attempts at disinheritance.
See, e.g., UPC § 2-202 (1990) (elective share); UPC § 2-301 (1990) (omitted spouse
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surveyed with a family income under $50,000 had no will.o50 The
study also produced the following statistics:







No children 10.9% 89.1%
Some minor children 32.2% 67.8%
All adult children 72.6% 27.4%151
These statistics show a correspondence between the size of an indi-
vidual's estate and the likelihood that the individual would have a
will. The presence of children in a family also seems to correlate
with will writing.152 Thus, will writing seems to be primarily a
function of economic desirability or practical need. Those with less
property may find will writing and the consulting of a lawyer too
costly and time consuming. Couples with no children may have less
motivation to write a will because there are no dependents to worry
about.
Unfortunately, statistics also demonstrate that individuals in
lower economic groups are at somewhat greater risk for family vio-
lence.153 While family violence pervades every segment of soci-
provision with respect to a premarital will of the decedent stating that "[i]f the tes-
tator's surviving spouse married the testator after the testator executed his [or her]
will, the surviving spouse is entitled to receive, as an intestate share, no less than
the value of the share of the estate he [or she] would have received if the testator had
died intestate.") Id. This section applies only to a premarital will and imputes an
intent to the testator similar to that attributed to the decedent under the intestacy
statutes. According to the comment following this section, "[tlhis section reflects the
view that the intestate share of the spouse in that portion of the estate not devised to
certain of the testator's children... is what the testator would want the spouse to
have if he or she had thought about the relationship of his or her old will to the new
situation" (emphasis added). Id. at comment. See generally WAGGONER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 473-78 (discussing the elective share doctrine).
150. See Fellows et al., supra note 96, at 336-39.
151. Id.
152. These statistics, however, may partially reflect an individual's advancing age
which has also been shown to increase the likelihood that an individual will have a
will. Id.
153. Statistics compiled by the U.S. Department of Justice indicated that the
highest victimization rates for family assault occurred in families with annual in-
comes of $29,999 or less. See CRIMINAL VICTnmzATION, supra note 12, at 152 (Table
V. Further, the lowest victimization rates for assault by a family member occurred
in families in the highest income groups-those with an annual income of $30,000 or
more. Id.
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ety,154 some segments appear to be hit harder than others. Thus,
ironically, intestacy statutes may apply a scheme of presumed dis-
positions to a segment of the population where a greater prevalence
of family violence shows such presumptions may be least war-
ranted. Divorce is also not a solution. Not only is divorce not avail-
able as a practical matter to some victims of family violence, such
as children and elderly relatives,155 but it may actually increase the
violence.156 Statistics show that often divorce actually increases
the abusive behavior and the likelihood that the victim, often the
former wife, will suffer serious bodily harm, if not death.157 Fi-
nally, whether the traditional remedy offered be the writing of a
will or the seeking of a divorce, these formal and independent ac-
tions are often beyond the abilities of victims of family violence pre-
cisely because they have been abused into subservience and have
assumed the role of victim and dependent.
IV. Practical Implementation of the Reform
As with any proposed reform, the attempt to provide an an-
swer to a problem often only elicits more questions. Aside from the
possible state constitutional challenges to the proposed family vio-
lence statute discussed above,158 several non-legal practical con-
154. See Asmus et al., supra note 8, at 121 ("domestic violence occurs in all socio-
economic and racial groups") (citing ADVOCACY PROGRAM DATA SUmMARY REPORT,
MINNESOTA DEP'T OF CORRECTION PROGRAM FOR BATTERED WOMEN 84-86 (1987)).
155. Although a few cases where children sought to divorce their parents were
widely covered in the media, this practice is not only extremely rare, but practically
insignificant. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So.2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In
the Kingsley case it is likely that the child's action was supported and funded by his
foster/adoptive parents. Without such rare emotional and financial support, it would
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for child victims of family violence to seek
divorce as a viable remedy.
Further, even if such a remedy was more widely accepted and available, it would
probably prove too costly and time consuming for many victims. In the case of adult
children of abusive parents who are living independently, there is little motivation to
seek such a drastic legal remedy. These individuals are no longer living in the fam-
ily home and may have effectively cut-off all social relations with the abuser(s). Yet,
if they die intestate, any clear intent to disengage from the abusive family member
will be ignored to the extent that, depending on individual circumstances, the
abuser may take all or a significant amount of the victim's estate. Similarly, depen-
dent elderly relatives might be reluctant to seek divorce.
156. See CRInNAL VicTIzATION, supra note 12, at Appendix V; Mahoney, supra
note 109, at 58. Mahoney notes that conflicting studies indicate that threatening to
leave an abusive relationship "may be very effective at ending the violence" or it may
cause the violence to escalate. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, Mahoney asserts that we
need to consider the victim, usually the battered wife, "the best judge on this issue,"
because she is both the target of the violence and the closest observer. Id. at n.2.
157. See CRIMINAL VICTI IZATioN, supra note 12, at Appendix V.
158. See supra part II.B. (discussing state constitutional challenges to the pro-
posed family violence statute).
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cerns regarding the implementation of the proposed statute also
need to be considered. Below, many of these questions and con-
cerns are anticipated and addressed.
A. The Privacy Concern
Concerns about family privacy and unwarranted government
intrusion into intimate relationships are of great significance. The
proposed reform, however, is actually highly protective of family
privacy. Under the proposed statute the court will only be able to
inquire to the extent the state has already recognized the violence
and intervened by issuing an order for protection, removing a child
from the home, or arresting or convicting a family member for fam-
ily violence against the decedent.159 In other words, the probate
court will only be able to go where the criminal law or child welfare
agencies have gone before it. Thus, the reform merely allows the
state via its probate courts to act on knowledge it already has.
Where the other branches of the law have made the decision to in-
tervene and take action, it makes little sense to keep the probate
court and family property law in the dark. More importantly, how-
ever, there is no significant privacy issue created because the scope
of the inquiry is limited to public records. By definition, the crimi-
nal law has already determined the specified actions or offenses to
be a matter of public concern, not family privacy.
Moreover, the privacy of the family has increasingly given way
to overriding state interests in other areas. A noted criminal law
scholar has observed that:
The taking of life, incest, and the imminent threat to the life or
health of a minor child all trigger the law's willingness to pene-
trate the privacy of family life because family privacy consider-
ations are outweighed by other important public goals. An
issue in the current debate about spouse battering and about
the proper threshold for intervention to halt child abuse con-
cerns whether other behaviors should be added to the short list
that has been a staple element of the jurisprudence of family
privacy all along. 160
The persistence of widespread family violence and the need to ad-
dress the problem consistently across all fronts of the law, as
demonstrated in this article, confirm that the answer is yes.
159. See supra part II.A. (discussing operation of proposed family violence
statute).
160. See Zimring, supra note 25, at 526.
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B. Concern that Denying Intestate Share to Abuser Would
Drive a Wedge Into the Family
This perception is related to the family privacy issue. The sa-
credness of family privacy was long used to shield abusers and the
rest of society from the ugly reality that many torts and crimes are
committed within the confines of the family structure. In the name
of family privacy, courts frequently declined to intervene in a vari-
ety of familial disputes, ranging from a wealthy husband's refusal
to provide his wife with indoor plumbing,161 to incidents of serious
violence. 162 Courts often justified their policy of nonintervention by
asserting that it was better for the family if they were left to work
the problem out among themselves. One scholar summarized this
view stating: "Preferring to assume that the wedge is driven by in-
tervention rather than violence, it reflects an ideology in which the
'sanctity' of marriage and the family supersedes the safety and au-
tonomy of women-the primary victims of domestic violence."163 In
view of what is now known about the cyclical nature of family vio-
lence6 4 and the inability of many victims to help themselves out of
such situations, this approach can no longer be justified or
tolerated.
C. The Probate Process: The Specter of Increased
Bureaucracy
For many, this proposed reform may seem intuitively right,
yet in the glaring light of everyday administrative concerns it may
appear to create only more inefficient bureaucracy that produces
few results. Yet the reality is that probate courts regularly ex-
amine extrinsic evidence with regard to a multitude of ordinary
probate problems. For example, when probating a will, courts may
be required to examine evidence of proper execution; 165 that the
161. See McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953). In this landmark fam-
ily privacy case, the court held that "Ithe living standards of a family are a matter of
concern to the household, and not for the courts to determine, even though the hus-
band's attitude toward his wife, according to his wealth and circumstances, leaves
little to be said on his behalf." Although one may be inclined to agree with this
doctrine on the facts of the given case, it is noteworthy that such an approach has
many implications for the proper role of state intervention regarding neglect of mi-
nor children. See generally Zinring, supra note 25, at 523-24 (discussing the impli-
cations and complications of the family privacy doctrine as applied to child neglect
law and a parent's right to discipline his or her child).
162. See Zimring, supra note 25, at 526-27.
163. See Asmus et al., supra note 8, at 117.
164. See TASK FORCE ON FAMImY VIOLENCE, supra note 5, at 2-3.
165. See, e.g., UPC § 2-502 (1990) (outlining minimal requirements for valid will
execution, and noting that "[i]ntent that the document constitute the testator's will
can be established by extrinsic evidence").
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testator intended the document to be his or her will;166 or evidence
of the contents of a lost will. 16 7 Thus, in the context of wills, the
courts are already conducting sophisticated inquiries in order to
best effectuate the testator's donative intent.
Additionally, in more complex areas of family law, such as di-
vorce and lack of support by a parent of a child, courts already ex-
amine the parties' behavior and consult extrinsic evidence. For
example, the Uniform Probate Code excludes from its definition of
who is a surviving spouse for inheritance purposes, former spouses
whose divorce from, or annulment of the marriage to, the decedent
was invalid for some reason, as well as those former spouses whose
marital property rights were validly terminated.16 s To determine
the status of a surviving spouse, the court must examine any legal
records of marriage, divorce, annulment etc. Similarly, under the
proposed family violence statute, the court would only be required
to consider the criminal and civil records of the surviving family
members of the decedent.
Further, in at least one context, the Uniform Probate Code
currently requires courts to inquire into extrinsic evidence more ex-
tensively than would be required under the proposed family vio-
lence statute. In order to encourage parental responsibility, the
Uniform Probate Code restricts inheritance rights "from or through
a child by either parent or his [or her] kindred"16 9 unless that par-
ent has "openly treated the child as his [or hers], and has not're-
fused to support the child."170 This behavioral standard requires
the court to conduct a wide ranging and loosely defined inquiry.
Unlike the limited inquiry defined in the proposed family violence
statute, the scope of the court's investigation under this existing
provision is not limited to specified records, nor is the time period
specified or at all limited. Thus, in light of the degree to which
courts already gather and consult extrinsic evidence relating to
family property rights, the proposed family violence statute would
not create any new or more complex administrative burdens.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., UPC § 3-402 (1990); MINN. STAT. § 524.3-402 (1994). But see 70
A.L.R.4th 323 (1989) (noting that many jurisdictions presume the decedent de-
stroyed the will if the decedent is known to have executed a will and it cannot be
found after the decedent's death).
168. See UPC § 2-802 (1990) (defining the effect of divorce, annulment, and a de-
cree of separation on inheritance rights of former spouses).
169. UPC § 2-114(c) (1990).
170. Id.
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D. Concern that the Impact of the Reform would be
Limited
Admittedly, the proposed reform is not a cure-all for family
violence. Due to its narrow focus and specific requirements, the
statute would address only the clearest cases of family violence -
cases where there are records establishing a pattern of violence im-
mediately prior to the decedent's death. Unfortunately, the pro-
posed statute would not remedy the many cases of undocumented
family violence. Nevertheless, the proposed family violence statute
would address substantially more cases of family violence than the
current scheme which fails to address family violence to any degree.
VI. Conclusion
Ultimately, there is no clear and convincing reason not to im-
plement the proposed family violence statute. In those cases where
the statute would operate to deny abusers any benefits from those
they abused the positive effects are clear. Yet even in situations
where the statute would not operate directly, perhaps the great ma-
jority of cases, the reform would nevertheless serve an important
function. It would represent an end to the tacit acceptance of fam-
ily violence and would send a clear message that family violence is
a relevant public concern in any context. Finally, the adoption of
the proposed family violence statute would bring family property
law into line with prevailing social and behavioral ideals. While
these ideals may yet need to be expanded further, the current





PROPOSED FAMILY VIOLENCE STATUTE171
Effect of Record of Family Violence on Intestate Succession and
Elective Share Right
(a) [Definitions.] In this section:
(1) "Abuser" is any family member of the decedent who
commits family violence against the decedent as defined herein.
(2) "Family Violence" means: (i) physical harm, bodily in-
jury, assault, or infliction of fear of imminent physical harm, bodily
injury or assault, between family members; or (ii) terroristic
threats, within the meaning of [relevant state statute(s)], or crimi-
nal sexual conduct, within the meaning of [relevant state stat-
ute(s)], committed against a family member by a family member.172
(b) [Forfeiture of Statutory Benefits.] An individual who com-
mits family violence against the decedent forfeits the following ben-
efits with respect to the decedent's estate: an intestate share, an
elective share, an omitted spouse's or child's share, a homestead al-
lowance, exempt property, and a family allowance. The decedent's
intestate estate shall pass as if the abuser disclaimed his [or her]
intestate share. 173
(c) [Commitment of Family Violence; How Determined.] Com-
mitment of family violence resulting in forfeiture under section (b)
is established:
(1) by a past pattern of family violence committed by the
abuser against the decedent within [5] years of the decedent's death
when the family violence is committed against the decedent while
the decedent was an adult. A pattern can be established only by (i)
court documents showing a conviction of the abuser for family vio-
lence against the decedent; (ii) arrest of the abuser for family vio-
lence against the decedent; or (iii) an issuance of an order for
protection on behalf of the decedent against the abuser; and
171. This statute is largely modeled after the UPC's slayer statute. See UPC § 2-
803 (1990). The statute also incorporates elements of Minnesota's domestic abuse
and domestic homicide statutes. See MiNN. STAT. § 518B.01 (Supp. 1994); MINN.
STAT. § 609.185 (Supp. 1994). The incorporation of language from these statutes is
noted throughout.
172. This section adopts the definition of domestic abuse as defined in Minnesota's
Domestic Abuse Act. MiNN. STAT. § 518B.01, subd. 2 (a) (1994). The only alteration
is the use of the term "family violence" instead of domestic abuse. As noted above,
this article uses the term family violence because it is more descriptive of the prob-
lem and better represents the range of violence, abusers and victims that the pro-
posed statute intends to address. See supra note 5 (discussing choice of the term
family violence).
173. This section is adapted from the forfeiture section of the UPC's slayer stat-
ute. See UPC § 2-803 (b) (1990).
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(2) by court documents when family violence is committed
against the decedent while the decedent was a minor. Court docu-
ments must show (i) a conviction for family violence by the abuser
against the decedent while the decedent was a minor; (ii) action by
governmental authorities to protect the decedent from the abuser;
or (iii) a tort judgment against the abuser in favor of the decedent
for family violence committed by the abuser against the decedent
while the decedent was a minor.
(d) [Broad Construction.] This statute shall not be considered
penal in nature, but shall be construed broadly to effect the policy of
this state to further the decedent's donative intent and to further
the state's interest in deterring family violence and providing for
surviving family members who have not engaged in abusive
behavior.

